The Ups and Downs of the Agreed Course: Russia, Britain and the Persian Crisis of 1911

Abstract

This article covers the interaction between Russia and Great Britain on the Persian Question in 1911, when a number of internal and external factors caused a serious political crisis in Qajar Iran, which directly affected international relations in the Middle East. In late 1910 – early 1911, the Persian government initiated an invitation of foreign experts to reorganize the finances of Qajar Iran. As a result of a rather complex discussion between St. Petersburg, London and Tehran, it was decided to invite a group of American specialists headed by William Morgan Shuster, an American financial adviser who had previously been involved in similar activities in the Philippines. This choice was later proven unfortunate: in many ways, it was Shuster’s approach that provoked the emergence and contributed to the deepening of the 1911 crisis. In addition, the paper considers the main factors and stages of development of the crisis, Shuster’s role in the events, St. Petersburg’s and London’s policies on the issue, as well as the differences in the approaches of Russian and British diplomacy to its resolution. It is demonstrated that in the face of a significant threat to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the Foreign Office (represented by Sir Edward Grey) displayed a willingness to make compromises on the Persian Question in order to prevent a break in diplomatic relations with Russia. At the same time, the crisis clearly demonstrated how fragile the balance of positions of the two Powers in the region was and how easily even a regional conflict can jeopardize the relationship between the two Powers in a wider context.