Responsibility as a Social Phenomenon
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37482/2687-1505-V134Keywords:
philosophy of responsibility, social responsibility, activity approach, essential forces of a personAbstract
This article focuses on the philosophical understanding of responsibility as a social phenomenon. Based on the analysis of classical and modern works on social responsibility, the authors conclude that this phenomenon is multifaceted and multidimensional. It is also considered to be an integral part of all spheres of social life since it is included in all types of activities and is present at all the stages of society’s development. The article shows social responsibility from the point of view of the social actor’s essential forces, that is, responsibility is considered to be a result of the manifestation and development of essential forces, ultimately, through the self-realization of social actors. Cooperation of labour is shown as the material basis of responsibility. The authors argue in favour of the activity approach to studying social responsibility. In this case, it becomes not only a regulator, but also a constituent element of human activity, which emphasizes both the retrospective aspect of responsibility and its positive, operational aspect. In addition, the article explores the connection between responsibility and social relationships, which give rise to reciprocal demands placed by subjects of responsibility on each other. These demands are expressed in the traditions of society and state, in morality, laws and other aspects. Thus, only the activity that is related to attitudes towards these demands can be considered responsible. The demands, in turn, become objective conditions underlying responsible activity. Further, the paper points out the need to study social responsibility in the unity of the objective and the subjective. According to the authors, the main criterion of socially responsible relations is the result of activity. It should be used to evaluate society’s level of responsibility both in the historical context and in modern conditions.
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