The Problem of Intentionality in J. Searle’s Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

This paper dwells on the understanding of intentionality by J. Searle, who developed the problem of intentionality as the core of the philosophy of mind. The research is relevant since the philosophy of mind occupies a prominent place in analytic philosophy, Searle’s concept of consciousness being central in this context. The purpose of the article is to describe Searle’s view on the problem of intentionality. He had to face the position that mental states (consciousness) do not exist, which was expressed by many representatives of analytic philosophy, including G. Ryle and D. Dennett. They relied on the ideas of behaviourism, with its stimulus-response formula, excluding consciousness as the mediator in this process. The paper demonstrates Searle’s arguments in defence of the existence of mental states. Moreover, Searle pointed out a criterion of the existence of consciousness, namely, intentionality. This criterion made it possible to draw a demarcation line between physical and mental states. Searle attempted to overcome the dualism of consciousness and physical processes, which was important since dualism was the subject of constant criticism from naturalists. The article uses the method of historical and philosophical analysis, comparative method and theoretical reconstruction. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that it demonstrates Searle’s significant contribution both to the problem of consciousness, by showing its specificity, and to the problem of intentionality.