Virtual/Augmented Realities, Haptics, and Problems of Ontology

Abstract

In this article, virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) are analysed from the standpoint of
digital materialism, which states that any digital matter (including VR and AR) is an in-material construct.
The authors describe VR and AR as special ontological models. It is emphasized that the basis for the creation and development of VR and AR is the sense of touch, which, in its turn, is a fusion of
sensations, including optic ones. Moreover, the authors consider the hand to be the source of and a
metaphor for VR and AR: it is the main organ of the human body responsible for touch and, therefore,
determines haptics as a fundamental mode of comprehension of regular reality. Thus, the concept of
entelechy introduced by Aristotle can serve as a key to understand how VR and AR are implemented
and presented. If, according to Aristotle, the soul as a hand is the entelechy of a natural body, then a
hand in a cyber glove, which makes staying in VR possible, is the entelechy of a body converged with
the electronic and digital environment. In the case of AR, a hand does not necessarily require technogarments and turns out to be the entelechy of a non-technological body immersed, with its help, into
the electronic and digital environment. As a result, VR and AR themselves become the entelechies,
that is, tangible, or, in other words, haptically perceived forms and images of being. The authors
conclude that both VR and AR depend on human experience and are ontologically irresponsible.
Allowing a person to comprehend his/her own existence in the affordances bestowed upon him/her,
VR and AR demonstrate how the human body reacts to the work of the brain immersed into the virtual
and augmented worlds.